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S
ince the late 1980s, developing countries have been privatizing their utili-
ties sectors primarily because of fiscal constraints. The public sector has
been unable to fulfill the massive investments necessary to bring up
these sectors to modern standards of service and coverage. Traditionally,
these sectors were viewed either as natural monopolies or as being of strategic
interest, thus requiring substantial regulation or direct public ownership.
Today, these arguments are no longer valid. Rapid technological changes
and new financial arrangements have put into question the historical notions of
natural monopolies. In addition, upon recognizing that many existing regulations
have become obsolete and even harmful to economic growth, countries began to
institute regulatory reforms. As economies also became more open, the pressure
to become more competitive brought calls for even more fundamental regulatory
reforms to reduce costs and increase productivity, competitiveness and growth.
With the ongoing privatization in the utilities sectors, the trend toward economic
regulatory reform is likely to continue in the future.
Like many developing countries, the Philippines has witnessed substantial
trade liberalization and economic deregulation in various economic sectors such as
telecommunications, banking and finance, water and air transport and cargo han-
dling, potable water distribution and sewerage, and energy generation, transmission
and distribution. Successive government administrations have also moved to priva-
tize the country’s utilities sectors and have helped devise new regulatory frame-
works for these sectors. For instance, to address the power crisis in 1992 and 1993,
the power generation sector was opened up to private sector participation. The late
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1990s also saw the concessioning of Manila’s water supply and sanitation systems
and the long-term leasing of Manila’s container terminal facilities.
This paper focuses on the electricity and downstream oil industries. Both
are essential to most productive processes and are important elements in final
demand. The electricity network has strong externalities as well as economies of
scale and scope. The government monopolized the generation and transmission of
electricity and closely regulated distribution throughout the country. Currently,
the power sector is at the forefront of deregulation and privatization. Prior to the
electricity sector’s deregulation in 1996, the government also heavily regulated
the oil industry. Unlike electricity, however, the oil industry neither exhibits as-
pects of natural monopoly nor displays economic features that would warrant gov-
ernment regulation.
This paper aims to summarize the major reforms in the power and down-
stream oil industries and to analyze the economics behind these reforms. Is regu-
lation necessary? What form of regulation should be adopted? How can the policy
reforms bring about competition? How will prices be set and investment financed?
Designing effective regulatory frameworks and enforcing them are not easy.
Effectively balancing redistributive concerns and efficiency requires efficient in-
stitutional mechanisms to resolve inevitable conflicts. With few exceptions, de-
veloping countries have the problem that a significant gap exists between rules
and enforcement capacity. Given the little experience in government regulation in
a market-driven setting, research is needed to provide a deeper understanding of
the issues associated with regulatory reforms within the context of economic, in-
stitutional and political structures, and to possibly come up with ways to shore up
weak administrative and enforcement capacities.
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 presents the underlying
theoretical foundation of regulation, particularly the regulation of utilities. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the prereform state of the power sector and the reforms under
Republic Act 9136. Section 4 compares the condition of the downstream oil in-
dustry before and after deregulation and discusses how the industry deregulation
has fared. Section 5 summarizes the emerging issues and policy implications of
the paper.
ECONOMIC REGULATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE
Why regulate utilities
Economic regulation refers to restrictions on prices, quantity, and entry and exit
conditions for certain industries. There are two main types of regulation: regula-
tion of structure and regulation of conduct (Valletti and Estache 1998). The former
includes setting merger controls, removing entry barriers and restrictions on the
line of business, or breaking up an integrated incumbent. The regulation of con-ALDABA 67
duct covers firms’ pricing behavior in terms of level and structure. The constraint
on prices can be both at the final and intermediate levels.
The most common economic argument for regulation is to address market
failures, economies of scale (and scope) in production, or inequities in demand.
Traditionally, governments have regulated the utilities sector. Compared with the
rest of the economy, utilities have three distinctive characteristics (Guash and
Spiller 1998):
) They require technologies that are commonly considered specific, sunk
investments;
) They display aspects of natural monopoly such as economies of scale
and scope in the physical provision of basic services, economies of
scale in planning and managing the network, network externalities and
advantages in raising capital, which are being gradually eroded by tech-
nological innovations;
) Their products are massively consumed by captive consumers with
fairly inelastic demand.
These features of the utilities sector formed the basis for raising the need for
governmental regulation. In theory, if there are economies of scale or scope, aver-
age costs decrease as the scale and scope of operations expands. This implies that
a single firm may be able to produce more efficiently than several competing
firms. However, the control over price exerted by a monopolist could give rise to
efficiency losses to society; hence, regulation is necessary to curtail abuses of
monopoly power.
On the other hand, when an industry is characterized by increasing returns
to scale or when network externalities or significant coordination costs are present,
regulation is also an important mechanism for increasing economic efficiency.
The general principle is to regulate segments of the market that exhibit natural
monopoly characteristics not only to restrain abuses of monopoly power but also
to protect consumers and ensure access (i.e., fair price and quality) by future com-
petitors to essential or bottleneck facilities often controlled by incumbent firms.
Interconnection and access to networks as an intermediate service or bottle-
neck facility is critical to fostering competition and reducing market domination.
Regulation should ensure that access and interconnection charges (a) promote an
efficient structure of production, use, and consumption; (b) allow network opera-
tors to make a sufficient return; and (c) promote efficiency while avoiding unnec-
essary construction of duplicate networks. In the presence of alternative delivery
systems or bypass technologies, the correct access prices become vital to ensure
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There are basically two approaches in addressing the access problem:
) Break up the vertically integrated dominant firm and prohibit the es-
sential facility spin-off from re-entering the competitive market; and
) Preserve the vertically integrated firm as a monopoly, while regulating
either the final prices to consumers or access prices to competitors, or
both, to promote competition.
The access problem becomes more serious in the presence of vertically in-
tegrated industries. By allowing the bottleneck owner to compete against other
firms, there is a danger that the incumbent will set access charges that may make
further entry difficult. Policies prohibiting vertical integration across monopolis-
tic and competitive segments of the production process are necessary to facilitate
access terms and to eliminate conflict of interest. The threat of market foreclosure
to upstream competitors has led to a policy of unbundling or separating the stages
of utility production.
Establishing and implementing an effective regulatory system is a difficult
activity; the process requires a regulatory tradition and track record, expertise and
strong institutional support that are often lacking in developing countries. The diffi-
culty is exacerbated because governments face multiple objectives such as ensuring
competition, generating high revenues from privatization for fiscal reasons, meeting
ambitious investment demands, facilitating the rapid expansion of basic services,
and taking into account distributional factors in the pricing of services.
Efficient regulation is hampered by the problem of asymmetric information:
Firms have a good idea of their costs and demand structure, but the regulator often
does not have access to such information. Moreover, since regulation redistributes
resources and rents, politicians can use it to secure political gains rather than correct
market failures—hence, leading to socially suboptimal economic results and under-
mining the effectiveness of even the well-designed regulatory framework.
How to regulate monopolies
Regulation is seen as a principal-agent relationship in which a regulator (the prin-
cipal) attempts to control the firm (the agent), a natural monopoly. The fundamen-
tal problem confronting the regulator is the asymmetry of information that can be
reduced but not eliminated. The regulated firm will always know more about its
economic environment, production cost, effort, demand and quality than the regu-
lator and will try to extract some rent from consumers as a result of the informa-
tion advantage.
Given the regulator’s lack of information about the regulated firm, Loeb
and Magat (1979) suggest that the regulator should simply transfer the consumer
surplus to the firm to induce the latter to behave optimally. However, this leavesALDABA 69
the equity issue or the cost of public funds unresolved because the monopolist
appropriates the entire economic surplus.
Baron and Myerson (1982) indicate that there is a trade-off between effi-
ciency and informational rents. Assuming that these rents are costly to society, the
Baron and Myerson model allows the monopolist to charge a higher price and
provides a pricing formula that accepts the monopolist’s cost declaration at face
value plus some margin.
Laffont and Tirole (1986) introduce a model with a richer asymmetry of
information both on the technology and unobservable cost-reducing efforts of the
firm. In this model, optimal regulation requires a menu of contracts to be offered
to firms. The contracts should be designed such that the firms themselves would
select the one that is consistent with their hidden information. Thus, a high-cost,
low-effort firm would not choose the same contract as the one chosen by the low-
cost, high-effort firm. Essentially, the point of Laffont and Tirole is that efficiency
gains must be balanced against the higher informational rents that the regulated
firm is required to give up in exchange. One important difference between their
model and that of Baron and Myerson is that, in the latter scheme, prices need not
be distorted to reduce informational rents.
Price regulation in practice
Regulation of a standard monopolist
There are two main approaches to monopoly regulation: rate-of-return regulation
and price cap regulation. The rate-of-return regulation is a cost-based regulation
that allows firms to earn sufficient revenues to cover costs, including a fair rate of
return on equity. The principle is to control prices, though indirectly, by allowing
the regulated firm to earn only a normal or fair rate of return on its capital invest-
ment. It is used in Canada, Japan, and is the dominant form in the United States.
This price-setting method requires detailed information on costs, assets and in-
vestments. Its main drawback is that it generates perverse incentives. As Estache
(undated) points out, guaranteed a set rate of return, the regulated firm tends to
overinvest in capital (the Averch-Johnson effect) or simply overstate the value of
assets when this is difficult to assess. The larger the value of the asset, the larger the
benefits allowed; hence, the higher the prices will be.
In addition, this method provides little incentive for productive efficiency
because the firm can pass production costs on to the final users in the form of
higher prices. The rate-of-return regulation penalizes efforts to reduce costs, as
these would have to be passed on in the form of lower prices to customers.
Price cap regulation was introduced in the United Kingdom as an alterna-
tive to the rate-of-return regulation. This method is used in some states in the
United States as well as in Australia, Puerto Rico, Singapore and Latin America. ItPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 70
is based on the control of maximum prices. Under this scheme, the firm is free to
increase its price between review periods at the rate of inflation (RPI) minus some
amount (X) to reflect expected increases in productivity arising from technologi-
cal improvements. The system provides incentives for cost reductions and effi-
ciency gains. That is, the firm retains any profits that may result from cost cutting
or technological innovation at least until the end of the review period. For the next
review period, the initial price and the new X will reflect the new cost structure,
therefore enabling consumers to benefit from the increased efficiency.
A problem with this pricing system is that it is difficult to determine the
magnitude and the time duration of the annual adjustment factor. In practice, the
resulting price cap is either too high, which allows the regulated firm to earn
enormous profits at the expense of consumers, or too low, which drives the firm
into bankruptcy. Another problem is that the regulated firm is given the incentive
to cut quality as a way of reducing costs and earning bigger profits. In contrast,
under rate-of-return regulation, over-investing in quality may be a rewarding strat-
egy for the firm.
With the introduction of electricity sector reforms in 2001, the Philippines
is currently shifting toward price cap regulation for retail tariffs of all distribution
utilities. The regulatory approach for distribution retail tariffs is still based on the
rate-of-return regulation principle with assets revalued on a replacement cost ba-
sis. The rate of return base cannot be greater than 12 percent.
Regulation of access/interconnection
The setting of access charges is another highly difficult exercise. In practice, regu-
lators may let access charges be set by private negotiation and intervene only if
parties fail to reach an agreement. Interconnection and access costs can be calcu-
lated in several ways, and, indeed, there are complexities in apportioning costs
into line-sensitive and traffic-sensitive areas; peak and off-peak hours; central
business district, metropolitan, provincial and rural areas; and different areas of
the network hierarchy.
In theory, the best solution is to set the access price equal to the marginal
cost of production. In this case, however, the incumbent will recover only the
variable cost and incur a loss equal to the fixed cost. Therefore, in the absence of
government subsidies, the alternative (“second best solution”) is to set access charge
equal to the average cost of the bottleneck owner. When different services are
produced with the essential input, still another alternative is to allow access charge
to follow an inverse elasticity rule in which the more a good is needed by a down-
stream user, the higher the access charge that the bottleneck owner should be
allowed to levy on that user.ALDABA 71
The efficient component pricing rule (ECPR), also known as the Baumol-
Willig rule, is a more creative second best solution. When final products are ho-
mogeneous and the market is contestable, the ECPR simply sets the access charge
equal to the difference between the final price and the marginal cost on the com-
petitive segment. The basic message of the ECPR is to set the access price equal
to the net benefit earned by society when that service is provided competitively.
The ECPR can avoid inefficient entry, but it does so at the expense of maintaining
the incumbent’s monopoly power over final goods.
The ECPR has been criticized because of its assumption that all firms face
identical cost structures and provide perfectly substitutable goods. Its opponents
suggest that access charge must consider cost and demand asymmetries between
monopolist and competitors as well as allow for several competitors by introduc-
ing product differentiation. Another criticism is it abstracts from incentives so that
there is no reason to have more than one firm in the competitive segment. There-
fore, entrants must be more efficient than the monopolist or they will never choose
to enter. In that case, however, the monopolist will cease providing the service at
all because it can earn higher revenues by selling its rights without incurring any
costs. Thus, it limits the development of dynamic efficiencies arising from com-
petition.
Laffont and Tirole (1996) propose a global price cap as an alternative to the
ECPR. The global price cap includes both access charges and final goods prices.
The bottleneck input is treated as a final good and included in the computation of
the price cap. The approach requires that the weighted average of all these prices
does not exceed the cap. When the cap is properly set, the regulated firm is in-
duced to choose an optimal price structure. It does not require the regulator to
measure marginal cost or to estimate demand elasticities. Nevertheless, one major
concern that has been raised regarding global caps involves predatory practices
that the incumbent can engage in. By increasing the access prices and reducing the
final product price, the incumbent can satisfy the global cap while engaging in a
price squeeze that damages competition.
In the Philippines, transmission rates are currently regulated by a revenue
cap scheme following the Energy Regulatory Commission’s adoption of perfor-
mance-based regulation in transmission wheeling rates in May 2003. Like retail
electricity rates, the regulation of transmission wheeling tariffs had been based on
the rate-of-return regulation principle.
Franchises and concessions: alternatives to price regulation
Franchises and concessions are seen as alternatives to regulation in natural mo-
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rights and use of assets to the private sector, and to set the initial price of services
and subsequent adjustment mechanisms.1 Compared to regulation, franchises and
concessions impose no informational requirements on a government agency. They
are important schemes for introducing private sector participation in sectors where
the government does not want to transfer ownership of assets to the private sector.
Franchising refers to the granting of a right or license to operate a defined
service and to receive associated revenues after a competitive bidding process is
carried out. Competitive bidding for the natural monopoly dissipates all the mo-
nopoly rents. A franchise is essentially a contractual arrangement. As such, it re-
quires the regulator to be constantly involved—to monitor compliance, reconcile
opposing interpretations of obligations and responsibilities, and negotiate the con-
tractual conditions.
Franchising natural monopolies offers the following advantages:
) Reduces opportunities for regulatory capture as well as the scope for
political interference in management;
) Encourages cost efficiency because franchise contracts specify maxi-
mum prices for set qualities of goods and services and permit cost
savings to accrue to the franchisee during the life of the contract;
) Fosters productive efficiency because the competitive nature of con-
tract bidding assures that the lowest prices are obtained but the fran-
chisee still earns a normal return on investment; and
) Achieves optimal pricing even when sunk costs rule out contestability
because competition occurs before firms commit themselves to invest-
ment programs.
Its disadvantages are:
) Requires complex design and monitoring systems when multiple bid-
ding targets are present;
) Cannot cover every conceivable circumstance;
) Renders contract enforcement difficult;
) Leads to poor service quality and lack of incentives due to the fixed-
term nature of the contracts; and
) Cannot commit to a path of price adjustments over the life of the fran-
chise. This allows the franchisee to abuse renegotiation opportunities,
which in turn renders the initial price bid (based on which the fran-
chise is awarded) almost meaningless.
1 Most of the discussions in this section were drawn from Guash and Spiller (1998).ALDABA 73
In sum, franchise-bidding is superior to monopoly regulation only if its
post-award abuses can be contained and if repeated bidding is practicable. Water
and sanitation, solid waste collection, urban transportation, rail, airport and sub-
way services, toll roads, and cable and television are the sectors that seem most
appropriate for franchise-bidding regulation.
Concessions are very similar to franchising. The only difference is that con-
cessions involve more detailed follow-up supervision and additional future obli-
gations of the operator are built into the contract. Concessions are well suited to
sectors with monopoly characteristics. The government delegates the right to pro-
vide a particular service to another party but maintains some control over the
sector by dictating the rights and obligations of the provider. Box 1 describes the
responsibilities of the government for concession. The service must be provided
under the conditions specified in the contract or license. The private sector as-
sumes operational responsibility and some of the commercial risk of provision. In
general, the concessionaire must achieve specified targets.
The approach includes build-own-operate, build-operate-transfer and lease-
and-operate contracts. Under the first two types of agreements, the private sector
is responsible for financing and carrying out the investment specified in the con-
tract. Under the build-operate-transfer scheme, the assets revert to the State at the
end of the concession terms, while under the build-own-operate system, the own-
ership of the existing assets and the responsibility for their future expansion and
maintenance are transferred to the private sector. Under the lease-operate-con-
tract, the private contractor receives a fee to provide the service, including operat-
ing and maintaining the infrastructure.
Concession arrangements embody a regulatory framework and in practice
should be viewed as an integral part of regulation rather than as a substitute for it.
The terms of the contract need to be monitored, enforced and occasionally re-
vised. In practice, the number of cases in which privatizations/concessions went
sour and contracts had to be renegotiated are quite high. The commonly-encoun-
tered problems are poor concession design, unclear concession/regulatory rules,
ex-post changes of the rules of the process and inappropriate bending to requests
for renegotiation.
POWER SECTOR
Industry Characteristics and Structure
The electric power industry encompasses four major activities:
) Generation: production of high-voltage electricity that ranges from 12
kilovolts to 500 kilovolts (kV);
) Transmission (grid network phase): conduction of large blocks of high
voltage electricity at the power plants to distribution companies;PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 74
) Distribution: delivery of electricity from the transmission system to the
final consumers at a usable level of voltage (usually 220 volts);
) Supply: contracting for the delivery of electricity to the customer, me-
tering and billing.
In most countries, the electricity industry is traditionally vertically integrated.
As Box 2 shows, the features of the electricity industry closely resemble those of
Framework
) Adopting legal provisions to enable the
granting of concessions
) Establishing or identifying regulatory
authorities
) Managing government support of
infrastructure projects
) Managing public relations and
information
Project identification and analysis
) Identifying projects amenable to
concessions (including inhouse and
unsolicited proposals)
) Prioritizing projects amenable to
concessions
) Hiring advisers
) Performing a preliminary review of the
costs and benefits of the project
(without duplicating the analysis to be
performed by the private sector),
especially in cases where the govern-
ment will be assuming part of the market
risk
) Reviewing legal and regulatory issues
) Determining preliminary selection criteria
) Granting permission for the project to go
ahead (for example, for the opening of
the bidding process)
) Setting a timetable for the project
Enabling and supporting measures for
specific projects
) Granting permits and other necessary
authorizations (environmental permits,
right of way)
) Determining the form of government
support for the project
Design of the concession arrangements
) Choosing legal instruments
) Allocating responsibilities
) Choosing and designing pricing rules and
performance targets
) Determining bonuses and penalties
) Determining duration and termination
) Designing adaptation mechanisms to
new or unforeseen circumstances
) Choosing and designing a dispute
settlement mechanismConcession award
) Choosing the method of award
) Making decisions regarding
prequalification and shortlisting
) Determining bid structure and evaluation
method
) Determining bidding rules and
procedures
) Proceeding with the bidding
) Negotiating
Exercising regulatory function
) Implementing regulatory function
) Supervising and monitoring
) Enforcing rules (imposing penalties)
Box 1. Government responsibilities
Source: Kerf et al. (1994) as cited in Guasch and Spiller (1998).ALDABA 75
a natural monopoly. This thus creates the rationale for the state’s direct control
through ownership and regulation. For instance, scale economies can provide the
network owner substantial market power. Other characteristics such as
nonstorability of electricity supply, consumers’ dependence on the suppliers and
the essential nature of the service can further enhance suppliers’ market power.
However, the traditional vertically integrated monopoly approach has changed
with the technological innovations in the 1980s. Now smaller optimal size of gen-
eration plants, combined with growth in the market size, has undermined the natural
monopolistic characteristics of the electricity industry and challenged the traditional
paradigm. While high-tension transmission and low-tension distribution systems
are natural monopolies, generation and supply are now considered competitive. This
allowed countries to adopt a market approach to power supply and introduce com-
petition and unbundling of the industry. The United Kingdom provided the main
impetus for radical reforms in an industry normally considered a natural vertically
integrated monopoly. Without any model to follow, the British government pursued
the deintegration of the industry that separated the natural monopolies from the
potentially competitive parts and created a spot market for bulk power. The British
experience has convinced observers that privatization works and reforms in the elec-
tricity sector are feasible and attractive.
The Philippine electricity sector prior to reforms:
circa 1900 up to the mid-1980s
The country’s electrification started in the late 19th century as La Electricista con-
structed a central station in Manila that generated electricity using 10 of 60-kilo-
watt AC steam generators. Franchises for electricity distribution were given to
Box 2. Major characteristics of the electricity industry
) Essential to most productive processes and is an element in final demand
) Cannot be stored
) Has strong externalities
) Investment is specific and cannot be divided
) Needs close coordination because supply and demand must be balanced continuously
throughout the system
) Economies of scale and scope are present
) Network takes a long time to build
) Demand and supply fluctuate randomly (demand fluctuates by day and season and with
variations in the weather, power outages cannot be predicted)
) Demand is highly inelastic to price changes
) Represents a captive market
Source: Guasch and Spiller (1998)PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 76
private and municipal or city government-owned utilities and cooperatives. In
1905, the Manila Electric Rail and Light Company (Meralco) took over La
Electricista after it was granted a 50-year franchise for the construction, mainte-
nance and operation of an electric railway and a light heat power system from
Manila to Pasig. In 1962, the Lopezes bought the company.
The legislation of Commonwealth Act 120 in 1936 created the National
Power Corporation (NPC), which would develop the country’s potentials for power
generation. Republic Act 2641 restructured NPC from a nonstock government-
owned corporation to a fully government-owned stock corporation. Energy regu-
lation began in 1936 with the legislation of Commonwealth Act 146, which cre-
ated the Public Service Commission (PSC) to supervise and control all public
services, including the power sector.
In 1971, Republic Act 6173 established the Oil Industry Commission to
regulate the oil industry and ensure the adequate supply of petroleum products at
reasonable prices. In 1972, the PSC was abolished and the regulation of electric-
ity and water was transferred to the Board of Power and Waterworks (BPW). In
the same year, Presidential Decree 40 allowed NPC to monopolize the generation
and transmission of electricity in the country. The same law granted NPC sole
ownership and control over one integrated nationwide transmission network used
for power generation. The Martial Law administration under Ferdinand Marcos
expropriated Meralco from the Lopez family. In 1973, Presidential Decree 269
established the National Electrification Administration (NEA) to provide finan-
cial and technical assistance to electric cooperatives. In 1979, legislation was passed
allowing NPC to acquire MERALCO’s thermal power plants. This resulted in a
substantial increase in its share from only one-third of total electricity capacity to
90 percent, making it the country’s major supplier of electricity.
In 1977, the Department of Energy (later renamed Ministry of Energy) was
created to formulate the government’s energy policies plans and programs. At the
same time, Presidential Decree 1206 dissolved the Oil Industry Commission and
established the Board of Energy (BOE), which was responsible for setting energy
prices, including those of petroleum products and electricity. In 1987, Executive
Order 172 reconstituted the BOE into the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).
By the mid-1980s, shortcomings in the country’s power supply were start-
ing to become evident. Table 1 shows that the average production of electricity
stagnated at 0.39 million kwh per 1,000 people between the periods 1981-1984
and 1985-1988. In contrast, the average production of electricity continued to
increase in other countries. For instance, Thailand’s  figure rose from 0.38 million
to 0.54 million kwh per 1,000 persons during the same periods. Electrification
growth deteriorated dramatically as the number of new households electrified
dropped from 250 million in 1983 to a measly 100 million in 1986 (Table 2).ALDABA 77
The World Bank (1993) notes that there were virtually no investments for
new base load power plants as the bulk of investments made concentrated on
improving the financial health of NPC. The 620-megawatt Bataan Nuclear Power
Plant that was to go commercial in the mid-1980s was mothballed for safety rea-
sons. The NPC had relied heavily on the plant as an important addition to its
supply and failed to invest and do maintenance work on its existing coal and oil
fired thermal stations (World Bank 1993). As a result of this neglect, power sup-
ply considerably lagged population growth, causing a full-blown power crisis in
the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Power outages increased in 1990 as several older oil-fired thermal stations
broke down. The country was also hit by natural disasters that severely affected
Table 1. Average Production of Electricity (in million kilowatt hours per 1,000 people)
Country 1977-1980 1981-1984 1985-1988
Philippines 0.35 0.39 0.39
Brazil 1.01 1.23 1.44
Chile 0.99 1.07 1.23
India 0.17 0.20 0.27
Indonesia 0.06 0.12 0.20
South Korea 0.93 1.30 1.77
Malaysia 0.64 0.83 1.50
Mexico 0.86 1.08 1.25
Thailand 0.30 0.38 0.54
Turkey 0.51 0.57 0.79
Source: World Bank Country Report 1993
Table 2. New households electrified outside Manila (in millions)
Year New Households Year New  Households
Electrified Electrified
1975 120 1983 250
1976 170 1984 210
1977 180 1985 160
1978 200 1986 100
1979 270 1987 110
1980 320 1988 -30
1981 260 1989 180
1982 330 1990 180
Source: World Bank Country Report 1993PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 78
the delivery of power. While the installed capacity of the two major grids in Luzon
and Mindanao appeared sufficient, their available capacity was woefully inad-
equate. In the Luzon grid, the available capacity ranged from 2,300 megawatts to
3,100 megawatts against an installed capacity of 4,321 megawatts. In the Mindanao
grid, the available capacity declined from 600 megawatts hydro in 1990 to 200
megawatts hydro in 1991, although its installed capacity was 1,053 megawatts
(904 hydro + 149 diesel). This electric capacity shortage meant greater unmet
demands. The NPC data showed a steady decline in the quality and delivery of
power in the Luzon grid. Between 1987 to 1990, the Luzon grid accounted for
almost 70 percent of NPC’s total installed generating capacity and for about 60
percent of NPC’s industrial customers. In 1989, the Luzon grid had 41 days of
brownouts for a total yearly duration of 429 hours, resulting in 91 Gwh of lost
energy sales. In 1990, there were 103 days of brownouts for an annual duration of
1,273 hours resulting in 251 Gwh of lost energy sales (Table 3). Based on average
tariffs, NPC’s revenue losses amounted to P418.63 million between 1987 and
1990. In addition to the unreliable power supply, the country’s electricity costs
were relatively high compared with that of other Asian countries (Table 4).
The NPC’s poor economic and financial viability, inadequacies in power
and relatively high costs of electricity pointed to the state’s failure in the areas of
ownership and control. Furthermore, the NPC’s accumulated losses of almost P2.4
billion between 1990 and 1991 led to its inability to self-finance and generate
enough profits to cover investment demand. Part of the dismal performance of the
sector could also be traced to distorted pricing and extensive subsidies as well as
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to the failure of the executive branch of the then Aquino administration to antici-
pate long-term market demand.2
Meanwhile, Meralco continued to enjoy unprecedented profits, which
reached about P1.9 billion in 1991. In his by-lined article for the Far Eastern
Economic Review, former Presidential Spokesperson Rigoberto Tiglao attributed
this to Meralco’s exorbitant margins on the electricity it bought from NPC. The
same report noted that Meralco’s average tariff in 1991 was 75 percent more than
the average rate charged by NPC, while Meralco’s counterpart in Thailand only
had a 25 percent mark up. Table 4 reveals that in 1991, Meralco’s average tariff
was 80 percent higher than NPC’s average rate.
In regulating prices, the Public Service Commission, the Board of Power
and Waterworks and their successor, the ERB, adopted a rate of return on rate
Table 4. Average tariffs (in US$ per kwh)
Country Function 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
/Utility
Philippines
NPC GT 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
MERALCO D 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09
Indonesia
PLN GTD 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06
Malaysia
TNB GTD 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.98 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.067 0.06
Singapore
PUB GTD 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Thailand  
EGAT GTD 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
MEA D 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Source: World Bank Country Report 1993
Notes: D distribution
GT generation and transmission
GTD generation, transmission, and distribution
2 SGV Consulting (1992) points out that the Aquino government had a hand in emasculating the energy
plans laid down during the Marcos regime.
3 Tiglao (1991) as cited in SGV (1992).PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 80
base (RORB) methodology. This allowed utility firms to set rates that would cover
operating costs and still have an opportunity to earn a reasonable rate of return on
the firm’s assets devoted to the business. The maximum rate of return permitted
was 12 percent of the rate base. The pricing regulations allowed Meralco to make
automatic billing adjustments to recover increases in NPC rates and other operat-
ing costs, including system losses arising from distribution inefficiencies and pil-
ferage. Since the cost of these losses could be passed on to consumers, electricity
companies had little incentive to reduce such losses.
First wave of power sector reforms
In response to the immediate problems of the power sector, the generation sector
was opened up to competition by allowing the private sector to invest and partici-
pate in augmenting the sector’s generation base capacity. Figure 1 describes the
resulting structure of the industry.  Executive Order 215 issued in 1987 abolished
the monopoly of the NPC and provided incentives for the private investors to
enter the generation sector.  In 1990, the government passed Republic Act 6957,
the first build-operate-transfer law in Asia. This relaxed the rules on entry of pri-
vate firms and reduced the scope for government intervention. In 1992, Republic
Act 7638 re-established the DOE, which was responsible for policy formulation,
planning and management. Republic Act 7648 was legislated in 1993, which en-
abled the Ramos administration to expedite independent power producers con-
Figure 1. Structure of the Philippine electricity industry after first deregulation attemptALDABA 81
tracts for the construction, rehabilitation, improvement and maintenance of power
projects. In 1994, the build-operate-transfer law was replaced with Republic Act
7718, which increased the number of variants of the build-operate-transfer concept.
The participation of private investors in the generation sector started in 1988
when NPC signed its first build-operate-transfer contract with Hopewell Energy
Management of Hong Kong for the construction of two 110-megawatt turbine
power plants in Luzon, which became operational in 1991. To generate additional
capacity, the NPC entered into a contract with several independent power produc-
ers through build-operate-transfer and related schemes. Table 5 contains a list of
41 independent power producer projects with signed contracts that were initially
awarded through negotiation and, later, through bidding procedures.
The World Bank (2000) describes the standard NPC contract as an energy
conversion agreement wherein NPC purchases all fuel and pays the generator for
converting it into electricity at a predetermined heat rate. Although the industry is
moving away from this type of agreement and toward one where plants accept
some market risk, the World Bank noted that NPC was planning several energy
conversion agreements. During this time, the World Bank observes that the indus-
try was also witnessing substantial natural gas development. Reserves in the
Malampaya gas field were estimated to be sufficient to provide a continuous sup-
ply of 400 million to 450 million cubic feet per day of gas for over 20 years. Its
total reserves was pegged at about 3 trillion cubic feet.
Between 1993 and 1998, the generation sector evolved from being a mo-
nopoly (in which NPC owned and operated all the power plants) to a monopsony
(in which NPC bought the electricity produced by the independent power produc-
ers) to a de-facto deregulated sector (in which private power producers can sup-
ply electricity directly to distributors and large industrial users). In 1998, total
generating capacity was 11,988 megawatts distributed as follows:
) 8,619 megawatts in Luzon;
) 1,554 megawatts in the Visayas;
) 1,552 megawatts in Mindanao; and
) 263 megawatts scattered throughout the country belonging to small
island grids.
The NPC accounted for about 54 percent of the total installed generating
capacity while independent power producers under contract generated the rest. In
addition, a total of 518 megawatts of privately-owned installed generation capac-
ity served distributors.
The NPC’s independent power producer (IPP) program arrested the power
crisis, expanded generating capacity and stabilized power supply. However, it has








































1. Casecnan hydro electric plant National Irrigation PPA 140 $0.165 20 Jan 2000 Jan 2020
Administration
2. Natural gas project KEPCO BOT 1200 1.2560 20 Jan 2002 Jan 2022
3. Sual Pangasinan Coal Hopewell Holdings Ltd. BOT 1000 25 Mar 1999 (phase I) June 2024




4. Mindanao II (Mt. Apo) Geo. PNOC-EDC PPA 48.25 1.550 25 Jul 1999 July 2024
5. Bakun A/B and C HEP NMHC/Ever/AE BOT 65 2.650 25 Jan 2000 Jan 2025
V/Pacific Hydro










7. Pagbilao coal fired TPP Hopewell Energy Ltd. BOT 700 1.7840 30 Ap 1996 (phase I) June 2026
June 1996 (phase II)
Table 5. List of independent power producer projects
Project Operator Type Capacity Cost Cooperation Commercial Contract
in megawatts (P/kwh) period operation expiration






















10. San Roque multi-purpose HEP Marubeni/SITHE BOT 345 3.3550 25 Jan 2005 Jan  2030
/Italian-Thai
11. Ambuklao Hydro Power Plant Miescor ROL 75 1.350 5 Oct 1995 Oct 2000
12. Baung, La Union Diesel PP First Private Power Corp BOT 215 1.373 15 Feb 1995 Feb 2010
13. Bataan EPZA Diesel Plant Edison Global Electric BOO 58 1.634 10 Jun 1994 Jun 2004
14. Benguet (Amphohaw) Mini hydro Hydro Elect. Dev. Corp ROL 22 88% *NPC rate 5 Jun 1992 Jun 2002
15. Binga Hydro Power Plant Chiang Jiang Energy Corp ROL 100 1.150 15 Aug 1993 Aug 2008
16. Calaca Batangas Diesel Plant Far East Levingston (FELS) BOO 90 1.779 5 Sept 1993 Sept 1998
17. Cavite EPZA Diesel Plant Magellan Cogen Utilities BOO 43 1.346 10 Dec 1995 Dec 2005
18. Clark Air Base Diesel Plant Electrobus Consolidated Inc ROM 50 1.140 7 Jul 1992 Jul 1999
19. Engineering Island Power Barge Sabah Shipyard SDN, BHD BOO 100 1.568 5 Oct 1994 Oct 1999
20. Gas Turbine (GT) power Barges Hopewell Tileman Ltd ROM 270 1.963 10 1993 2003
21. General Santos Diesel Plant Alsons/Tomen BOO 50 1.526 18 Ap 1998 Ap 2016
Table 5 continued
Project Operator Type Capacity Cost Cooperation Commercial Contract
in megawatts (P/kwh) period operation expiration








































22. Iligan City Diesel Plant I Alsons/Tomen BOT 58 1.437 10 Jul 1993 Jul 2003
23. Iligan City Diesel Plant I Alsons/Tomen BOT 40 12 Dec 1993 Dec 2005
(1-7) 1.525
(8-12) 1.318
24. Leyte A  (Leyte-Cebu) Geo PNOC-EDC PPA 200 1.650 25 Nov 1997 Nov 2022
25. Leyte A  (Leyte-Cebu) Geo PNOC-EDC PPA 440 1.550 25 Jul 1998 Jul 2023
26. Limay Bataan CC, Block A ABB/Marubeni/ Kawasaki BTO 300 0.920 15 SC May 1994 Oct 2009
CC Oct 1994
27. Limay Bataan CC, Block A ABB/Marubeni/ Kawasaki BTO 300 0.934 15 SC Apr 1993CC Jan 1995 Jan 2010
28. Makban Binary Geo Plant ORMAT Inc BTO 15.73 0.337 10 Mar 1994 Mar 2004







30. Mindanao Diesel Power Barge Mitsui/BWSC BTO 200 15 Apr 1994Jul 1994 Apr 2009
(1-7) 0.7840
(8-15) 0.7950
31. Mindanao I (Mt. Apo) Geo PNOC-EDC PPA 47 1.5578 25 Feb 1997 Feb 2022




Project Operator Type Capacity Cost Cooperation Commercial Contract
in megawatts (P/kwh) period operation expiration










33. Navotas Diesel Power Barge I East Asia Power Corp. BOO 60 1.5598 5 Sept 1994 Sept 1999
34. Navotas Gas Turbine No. 4 Hopewell Energy Int’l Ltd BOT 100 2.0690 12 Mar 1993 Mar 2005
35. Navotas Gas Turbines Nos. 1-3 Hopewell Holdings Ltd. BOT 210 2.0640 10 Jan 1993 Jan 2003
36. North Harbor Diesel Barges Far East Levingston (FELS) BOO 90 1.5670 5 Jul 1994 Jul 1999
37. Pinamucan, Batangas Diesel PP Enron Power Corp BOT 105 2.0190 10 Jan 1993 Jan 2003
38. Subic Zambales Diesel Plant I Enron Power Corp. ROM 28 1.5487 5 Jan 1993 Jan 1998
39. Subic Zambales Diesel Plant II Enron Power Corp. BOT 108 1.6590 15 Mar 1994 Mar 2009
40. Toledo Cebu Coal Thermal Plant Atlas Consolidated Mining PPA 55 1.00 10 Jul 1993 Jul 2003
41. Zamboanga Diesel Power Plant Alsons/Tomen BOO 100 1.4730 18 Dec 1997 Dec 2015
Notes: PPA Power purchase agreement
BOT Build-own-transfer
BOO Build-own-operate
BROT Build, rehabilitate, operate and transfer
Source Reside (2001) and National Power Corporation as cited in the World Bank Country Framework Report for Private Participation in Infrastructure (2000)
Table 5 continued
Project Operator Type Capacity Cost Cooperation Commercial Contract
in megawatts (P/kwh) period operation expiration
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total liabilities) in 1998 (World Bank 2000). Furthermore, even with the independent
power producer scheme, competition was limited. What transpired next was
another form of public procurement where the independent power producers be-
came contractors to the existing monopoly, the NPC, for a set of specialized ser-
vices that included financing. In view of the absence of clear rules and appropriate
regulatory framework, negotiated deals were carried out by NPC and the private
contractors. Under these circumstances, the deals negotiated unduly favored in-
vestors while NPC became a monopsonist in the market for capacity and energy.
Given the lack of credible rules and the government’s inexperience in contracting
in this area, the procurement of privately generated electricity could not be achieved
without the government assuming all risks over prices and quantities. The inde-
pendent power producer received a physical quantity of fuel from NPC and then
converted it to kilowatt hours for a processing fee, taking no risks with respect to
either input or output prices. As Box 3 reveals, the government has borne virtually
all risks except construction costs and some risks associated with the efficiency of
operation and availability.
In contrast, independent producers in the United States were able to work
out satisfactory power purchase contracts because of the presence of a predictable
regulatory framework and a strong judicial system for contract enforcement. For
example, the regional monopoly in Virginia, the Virginia Electric and Power Com-
pany (VEPCO), requested construction bids for power plants mainly on the basis
of the price it was prepared to pay for power (Churchill 1995). That is, VEPCO
identified the amount of power it needed and approximately when and where,
Box 3. Risk allocation in the typical energy conservation agreement
Category of risk Risk borne by government Risk borne by others
Construction cost 
Interest rate 
Operation and maintenance cost 
Plant efficiency 




Availability, convertibility, transferability 
Retail tariff 
Sovereign 
Source: World Bank Country Framework Report for Private Participation in Infrastructure,
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stated the price it was prepared to pay and then asked for bids. It was the devel-
oper who took the risk over the number of plants to build and their locations as
well as the profitability of the enterprise. The public sector and VEPCO were not
involved in developers’ prebidding decisions. Bidders then came forward with
proposals that more than satisfied the capacity requirements.
In retrospect, given the Philippines’ institutional and regulatory limitations, it
may be concluded that the country did succeed in addressing the immediate prob-
lems of the power sector. The price the government paid for doing so, however,
which is to assume unfavorable financial commitments and provide broad guaran-
tees for market risks, is likely to prevent the country from further expanding genera-
tion capacity in the future. Indeed, the excessively risky and costly contractual agree-
ments has led to a gradual deterioration of the NPC’s financial position. As Reside
(2001) points out, the costs were mostly embedded in the generous off-take (take-
or-pay) arrangement, where NPC agreed to purchase power from IPPs regardless
of the required level of dispatch. Inexplicably, as Tuano (2001) observes, the NPC
management also locked the company into multi-year power purchase agreements
that were at least 25 percent more expensive than the government’s own generated
power and had to be paid at 75 percent to 80 percent of the agreed price in the
event that NPC chooses not to use the facility. It must be noted that these contracts
were negotiated under the assumption that NPC would remain a monopoly and
would be able to pass on its costs to consumers. With the economic slowdown due
to the Asian crisis and political instability in the country, this meant excess power
supply, which became increasingly costly given the contractual commitment to
pay for such excess supplies. In 1999, NPC incurred a loss of P5.9 billion. This
further increased to P9.9 billion in 2000. These huge losses required NPC to con-
stantly rely on external sources to finance its capital requirements, which meant
increasing servicing costs that consequently took a heavy toll on its capacity for
maintenance, repairs and expansion in its transmission capability.
Second wave of power sector reforms
To achieve a more socially optimal outcome in the electricity sector, it is not
enough to simply set in place a more competitive environment for power genera-
tion, as this has limited impact on efficiency improvements, especially if the tradi-
tional monopoly structure remains. An equally important reform initiative is to
unbundle the services offered by the vertically integrated monopoly, splitting them
into those that can be provided under more competitive conditions and those that
continue to have the attributes of a natural monopoly.
Cognizant of this principle, in June 2001 Congress passed into law the Elec-
tric Power Industry Reform Act (Republic Act 9136), otherwise known as EPIRA,
to accelerate the total electrification of the country and ensure the quality, reliabil-PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 88
Figure 2. Power industry structure after EPIRA
GENCOS generation companies DUs distribution utilities
WESM wholesale electricity spot market ECs electric cooperatives
SPUG small power utilities group
Source: Department of Energy
ity, security and affordability of electric power in a regime of free and fair competi-
tion. Distinguishing four separate production segments in the power sector—
namely, generation, transmission, distribution, and supply—the Act ordered the
restructuring of the industry by separating the services with natural monopoly
elements from those that are potentially competitive. (See Figure 2.) Thus, gen-
eration and supply were specified to be competitive and open, while transmission
and distribution were required to be regulated. Accordingly, the remaining power
facilities of NPC as well as the transmission system were stipulated to be priva-
tized and the creation of a wholesale spot market for bulk power was provided for.
In addition, EPIRA spelled out the main rules for the regulation of the four pro-
duction segments as well as the rules for transition and the obligations and rights
of all players involved (i.e., the service providers and government agencies).
Privatization and government regulation
The Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM), a
government-owned and controlled corporation, was established to manage the
sale and privatization of NPC generation assets and independent power producer
contracts and would exist for 25 years.
The National Transmission Company (TRANSCO) was created to carry out
the electrical transmission function of the NPC. It is responsible for the planning,ALDABA 89
construction, and centralized operation and maintenance of the high voltage trans-
mission facilities, including grid interconnections and ancillary services. The
TRANSCO is wholly owned by the PSALM. The transmission facilities (includ-
ing grid interconnections and ancillary services) will be awarded to a qualified
party in open competitive bidding through an outright sale or a concession con-
tract. The concessionaire will have a contract period of 25 years, subject to review
and renewal for a maximum period of another 25 years.
The NPC remains as a national government-owned and controlled corpora-
tion and is responsible for the missionary electrification function through the small
power utilities group (SPUG). It is also responsible for providing power genera-
tion and delivery in areas not connected to the transmission system. It continues
operating the Agus and Pulangui complexes, both owned by PSALM. The NPC/
PSALM will not incur any new obligations to purchase power through bilateral
contracts with generation companies or other suppliers.
The NEA is responsible for preparing electric cooperatives  to operate and
compete under a deregulated electricity market within five years from the effec-
tivity of Republic Act 9136.
The DOE supervises the restructuring of the electricity industry and is re-
sponsible for the formulation of energy policies, plans and programs. Its other
functions include the following:
) Ensure the reliability, quality and security of supply of electric power;
) Encourage private sector investments in the electricity sector and pro-
mote development of indigenous and renewable energy sources;
) Facilitate and encourage reforms in the structure and operations of
distribution utilities for greater efficiency and lower costs; and
) Establish the wholesale electricity spot market and formulate the de-
tailed rules of its operations.
The ERC is responsible for the regulation of the electric power industry. It
is tasked to promote competition, encourage market development, ensure cus-
tomer choice and penalize abuse of market power. Among its functions are the
following:
) Promulgate rules and regulations, including but not limited to, compe-
tition rules and limitations on the recovery of system losses;
) Review and approve plans for the expansion and improvement of fa-
cilities submitted by TRANSCO or its buyer or concessionaire;
) Determine, fix and approve transmission and distribution wheeling
charges and retail rates as well as the universal charge to be imposed
on all electricity end-users, including self-generating entities;
) Promulgate a Grid Code and a Distribution Code for the access andPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 90
use of the transmission and distribution facilities;
) Enforce the rules and regulations governing the operations of the whole-
sale electricity spot market (WESM);
) Ensure that all electricity industry participants, including NPC, will
functionally and structurally unbundle their businesses and rates and
determine the levels of cross subsidies in the existing retail rates until
these are phased out as well as set a lifeline rate for marginalized end-
users;
) Determine the electricity end-users comprising the contestable and cap-
tive markets.
Price regulation
Competition is the norm in generation and supply of electricity, and the prices
charged by generation companies are not regulated by the ERC. Distribution and
transmission are considered natural monopolies, and their price system consists
of regulated charges. The regulated price to final consumers consists of the fol-
lowing: generation, transmission, distribution, supply and other related charges
for electricity service.
The ERC bases its price regulation on the principle of full recovery of pru-
dent and reasonable economic costs incurred or such other principles that would
promote efficiency. In case the rate setting methodology used is the RORB, the
TRANSCO or its buyer (or any distribution utility) may revalue its eligible assets
no more than once every three years. Interest expense is not allowed as deductions
from permissible RORB.
Box 4 describes the details of the current price regulation method used by
the ERC. The ERC applies a RORB methodology using a maximum rate of return
on rate base of 12 percent for NPC and private distribution utilities. However, for
rural electric cooperatives, ERC applies a different methodology. Electric coop-
eratives are allowed to recover costs of their annual cash flow. Acceptable ex-
penses include the cost of purchased power from NPC as well as the nonpower
costs of administration, billing, operation and maintenance, amortization of loans
from NEA and provision for reinvestment. System losses can also be recovered
through the tariff (World Bank 2000).
Competition and access rules
To join the power generation segment, a new company will need to secure a cer-
tificate of compliance from the ERC. For distribution, entry requires a national
franchise granted by Congress. The supply of electricity to endusers requires a
license from the ERC except for the supply of electricity by distribution utilities
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market is allowed among all end-users with a monthly average peak demand of at
least 1 megawatt. After two years, the threshold level will be reduced to 750 kilo-
watts. Generation companies and distribution utilities are not allowed to partici-
pate in transmission. Likewise, the transmission company is not allowed to partici-
pate in either the generation or distribution segments.
Stranded costs
The NPC’s stranded contract costs and distribution utilities’ stranded contract costs
are recovered through the universal charge. Here, the ERC reviews the petitions
for cost recovery filed by PSALM and any distribution utility that has an eligible
contract. It determines, fixes and approves the level of stranded costs. Every year,
the ERC conducts a review to determine whether there is an under- or over-recov-
ery and adjust the level of stranded cost recovery charge accordingly.
Emerging issues
Despite opposition from some political groups and members of civil society, great
progress has been made in enacting ownership, structural and regulatory changes
in the Philippine electric power industry. However, more needs to be done par-
Box 4. Current price regulation by ERC
The effective selling price consists of two components:
) Basic rate covers the operating and maintenance expenses, cost of purchased power
and the cost of fuel used in operating the electric power plants. It remains the same
until the utility files for a change subject to ERC’s approval;
) Cost adjustment mechanism is a method to allow utilities to automatically recover
additional cost resulting from factors that are beyond the control of the utility such as
imported fuel prices, currency depreciation, and cost of electric power bought from
independent power producers;
For MERALCO, the cost adjustment mechanism is made up of the following:
) Purchased power adjustment (PPA) recovers changes in cost of power purchased from
NPC and its own independent power producers not covered by basic rate and the cost
of distribution system losses;
) Currency exchange rate adjustment (CERA) recovers changes in foreign–denominated
operating costs and principal debt repayment due to exchange rate movements;
For NPC, it is composed of the following:
) Purchased power cost adjustment (PPCA) recovers changes in power purchased from
IPPs;
) Fuel cost adjustment (FCA) recovers changes in operating costs due to changes in fuel
prices;
) Foreign exchange adjustment (FOREX) recovers changes in foreign disbursement due
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ticularly in terms of ensuring competition in the industry. Access rules for trans-
mission and distribution (i.e., who will be dispatched, in what order and when) as
well as a pricing system (price caps or rate of return minus adjustments for effi-
ciency changes) that allows consumers to share in efficiency gains, are still in
need of attention. Much more than access and pricing rules is the need to immedi-
ately address the social tension and conflicts that have mired the transition pro-
cess. Is ERC capable of efficient regulation? As commonly practiced in the coun-
try, where the Chief Executive is the final regulator, will President Gloria Arroyo
be able to strike a balance between efficiency and redistribution, and resolve the
conflicts in a manner that does not diminish investor confidence and the credibil-
ity of the regulatory framework?
Stranded costs, rising prices and the resulting social conflict
The Power Act was conceived in an environment characterized by distrust be-
tween consumers and providers, and between legislators and the executive branch
of the government. Its enactment in June 2001 was met with political opposition
and civil society and consumer discontent. As expected, the increase in prices
brought about by the liabilities of NPC (both on its own debt and on the liabilities
associated with the independent power projects), particularly the purchase power
adjustment (PPA), became the focus of public ire.
Militant groups called for the total abolition of NPC’s and MERALCO’s
PPA; some civil society groups demanded a full review of NPC’s contracts with
independent power producers, which they claim are onerous and to blame for the
high PPA charges. Amid mounting pressure and widespread public protests, Presi-
dent Arroyo ordered the NPC to stop its P1.25 per kwh PPA charge until the ERC
approved the universal charge of P0.40 per kwh proposed by NPC, which would
be levied for a period of 20 years in lieu of the PPA.
 The other important players—the members of the Senate and the House—
are rushing to pass their respective bills as they attempt to outdo each other on
who could offer the public a cheaper power deal. The administration senators are
proposing a three-year relief from the PPA for all residential consumers and a one-
year suspension for industries. The opposition, on the other hand, is proposing a
cap on the PPA of Meralco and other distribution utilities at P0.23 per kwh. For
NPC’s PPA, the first 50 kwh would be exempt from the charges, the second 50
kwh would be charged P0.21 per kwh and consumption above 100 kwh would be
charged P0.42 per kwh. The proposal also seeks to exclude costs and items such
as income tax, franchise tax and working capital from the charges to customers.
Meanwhile, two members of the House of Representatives want the government
to take over Meralco’s operations.ALDABA 93
As the biggest distributor and retailer of electricity in the country serving a
total of 3.7 million customers, Meralco’s franchise covers Metro Manila, Bulacan,
Cavite, Rizal and certain parts of Batangas, Laguna, Quezon and Pampanga. It
buys power from four sources: NPC, which accounts for 66 percent of its total
energy requirements, and three independent power producers consisting of
Duracom Power, First Gas Power Corporation (also owned by the Lopez group)
and Quezon Power Philippines.
Since 1994, Meralco’s basic rate of P3.40 per kwh has not changed. In March
2000, Meralco submitted a petition to ERB asking for a P0.30 per kwh increase.
This was superseded by its unbundling petition, which represented an increase of
P1.12 per kwh. This price hike proposal by Meralco all the more enraged the
public. Worrisome are the following findings of an independent study on electric-
ity prices commissioned by the DOE :4
) Meralco’s application for a rate increase was based on a total revenue
requirement of P150 billion and RORB of 17 percent versus the study’s
estimated total revenue requirement of P121.4 billion and RORB of
12 percent;
) Meralco was overcharging its consumers by P0.408 per kwh, broken
down as follows:
- P0.20 per kwh due to the inclusion of income tax payments as part
of operating expenses;
- P0.09 due to the use of an 11.5 percent provision for system losses
instead of the 9.5 percent ceiling imposed by Republic Act 9136;
- P0.08 due to the practice of including a two-month cash working
capital in the rate base (Meralco is able to collect at about the
same time the money it needs to pay for the power it buys);
- P0.03 per kwh due to the inclusion of about P700 million in prof-
its from related businesses such as pole rentals;
- P0.005 per kwh due to inclusion of P5 billion worth of revaluation
in depreciation expenses;
- P0.003 per kwh due to inclusion of P576 million worth of idle
land that it plans to use later.
The current social tension constrains the deregulation process. The extent
to which the tension can be reduced depends on how the following issues are
managed:
4 Batino (2002). In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the ERC (formerly the ERB) ordering
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) What should be the appropriate policy on stranded costs? One major
concern in the deregulation of the sector has been the staggering cost
of stranded assets. The DOE has estimated stranded cost to be around
P800 billion (Reside 2001). Of this, Congress has temporarily capped
government’s share of the expense at P200 billion. The rest will be
recovered through a universal levy and the earnings of TRANSCO. As
earlier indicated, NPC has proposed a universal charge of P0.40 per
kwh. Many of the independent power producer contracts are feared to
be lopsided and opposition groups have been clamoring for a review
and amendment of contracts. This would require external audits and
scrutiny that reward prudent independent power producers and punish
arbitrary and onerous ones. On the other hand, full absorption of the
stranded costs by the government would lead to a further deterioration
of the country’s fiscal position. As it is, the expected impact of elec-
tricity deregulation on the fiscal deficit is already enormous. The sus-
pension of PPA payments ordered by the president implies an increase
in borrowing by around P15 billion. While this leads to lower electric-
ity prices to consumers, household taxes will eventually have to rise.
The World Bank (2000) also notes that a contractual buyout option
was one major weakness of the independent power producer contracts.
The estimated contractual buyout obligation reached US$7.85 billion.5
In most cases, NPC could not exercise this option and had no choice
but to wait for these contracts to expire unless the independent power
producers voluntarily agree to NPC’s request for negotiation. Clearly,
there is a need to effectively balance these concerns versus the need to
attract investors and establish credible regulation.
) What should be the correct policy on rate unbundling and rebalanc-
ing? How should the price increase arising from the removal of subsi-
dies be managed? The country’s tariff structures evolved into a com-
plicated pattern of cross-subsidies that had little relationship to real
costs and few incentives to minimize costs. Industrial and commercial
users subsidized the more numerous residential consumers while ur-
ban users subsidize rural users. This type of pricing system puts an
enormous burden on regulation and the overall objective of attaining
both efficient production and consumption of services provided is lost.
The introduction of competition in the electric power industry ought to
bring down prices and obviously this requires substantial unbundling
5 Assuming a total buyout of 45 executed contracts using a discount rate of 10  percent.ALDABA 95
and rebalancing of prices. The issue is that this will create tremendous
uncertainties regarding the structure of retail electricity prices (Reside
2001). While the business sector is expected to gain, the welfare im-
pact on households is uneven. Government studies indicate that the
removal of cross-subsidies will reduce rates by P0.20 per kwh in elec-
tricity rates in Luzon but will increase rates by P1.00 per kwh in the
Visayas and by P0.30 per kwh in Mindanao (Tuano 2001).
Unless these transition issues are resolved, consultations and negotiations
will be slow and protracted, and it will be difficult to effectively proceed with the
deregulation of the electricity industry.
Regulatory capacity of ERC
Regulating the power sector is essentially political in nature. Regulation is a game
representing a problem of conflict and interactive strategies (Guasch and Spiller
1998). The existence of real and potential monopoly rents in the industry results
in competing claims for those rents. Electricity is a basic necessity consumed by
all Filipinos. The importance of the industry to the voting population and the po-
tential redistribution of income that can be achieved by expanding access are two
reasons that power is a highly politicized sector. For the sector to be governed
effectively, it is necessary to resolve the conflicts of interest at the least cost in
terms of efficiency and profitability. Sophisticated access rules and incentive sys-
tems are meaningless if there is no basic agreement among the varying and com-
peting interests and groups on how gains and losses will be shared.
Apart from setting the rules of the game for ownership, investment and op-
erations, the ERC must help resolve and manage the social conflict, improve ac-
countability and ensure transparency. The ERC itself is undergoing substantial
change as it tries to adapt to its changing environment and to build up the regula-
tory mechanisms to address problems of market failure and anticompetitive prac-
tices. While previously, the ERC (or ERB) regulated only a monopoly and a gov-
ernment corporation, the ERC is currently the regulator and competition agency
rolled into one. With the present reforms, ERC must confront new issues that will
test its regulatory efficiency. This will hardly be a trivial task. Regulatory capacity
is not built overnight. It is a process that requires adequate training, accumulation
of knowledge through trial and error, progressive narrowing of the information
gap between the regulator and the regulated firms as well as the availability of
technical, managerial and administrative resources.
The difficulty of establishing an effective regulatory regime is aggravated
by the country’s lack of regulatory tradition or track record in the effective use of
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other government objectives, namely, ensuring competition, generating high rev-
enues from privatization for fiscal reasons, satisfying ambitious investment de-
mands, facilitating the rapid expansion of basic services and factoring in distribu-
tional concerns in the pricing of services. This is further exacerbated by politi-
cians who use regulation to advance short-term political goals that have adverse
consequences on investors or that disregard information asymmetries in costs and
performance, thus compromising efficiency concerns. All these factors compli-
cate ERC’s regulatory functions. They may slow down the implementation of re-
forms, unless the ERC designs efficient mechanisms that balance the gains and
losses among different constituencies and resolve conflict of interests—a task that
would be rendered less difficult if openness, transparency and accountability are
upheld by all parties involved. Participatory mechanisms and greater reliance on
competition and market signals would be desirable components as well of the new
regulatory policies.
The Philippine experience shows that, whenever controversial issues arise,
the regulatory agency usually adopts a hands-off policy and leaves the final deci-
sion to the President of the Republic. This has turned the office, if not the person,
of the president a powerful interventionist element as well as the final arbiter, thus
compromising the regulatory agency’s credibility and independence in making
decisions. Thus, as De Vera (1997) argues, as long as the president continues to
mediate and broker controversies, the Presidency as an institution becomes an
object of regulatory capture.
DOWNSTREAM OIL SECTOR
Industry characteristics
The Philippine oil industry is divided into two sectors: the upstream sector, which
covers the exploration and production of crude oil; and the downstream sector,
which involves refining, transportation and marketing (Figure 3). In 1999, the
country’s total oil production provided less than 2 percent of total consumption.
Given the small quantity of proven oil reserves, the upstream sector is limited in
scale and scope; hence, the organization of the industry is largely concentrated on
downstream operations. The refining, transporting and marketing stages of the
downstream oil sector do not exhibit natural monopoly characteristics. Thus, the
heavy government regulation of the industry from 1971 to 1996 could only have
been due to political reasons. And pricing policies must have been largely due to
political rather than economic considerations.
Pre-deregulation phase: 1970s to early 1990s
Prior to the Martial Law years and the first oil crisis of the 1970s, the downstream
oil industry was relatively free, and competition was generally healthy. Six oilALDABA 97
refining companies (Shell, Caltex, Esso, Mobil, Filoil and Getty) then operated in
the country. After the oil crisis in 1971, the government decided to regulate oil
prices through the creation of the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) through Repub-
lic Act 6173. In 1973, Presidential Decree 334 established the Philippine Na-
tional Oil Company (PNOC) to ensure the stability of oil supplies in the country.
Government involvement in the sector soon increased significantly when PNOC
acquired Esso and Filoil and entered into a joint venture with Mobil.
Aside from the deregulation of the BOE and the creation of the DOE, an Oil
Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was established to maintain retail prices of pe-
troleum products at relatively stable levels. The industry contributed to the fund
when crude oil prices were low and drew from it when prices increased. The Cen-
tral Bank also provided forward exchange cover to oil firms, guaranteeing the
exchange rates on the day oil shipment contracts were signed for a period of 90 to
120 days. The whole process, however, soon led to huge deficits, forcing the gov-
ernment to pour money into the fund.
Between 1969 and 1981, the number of retail stations declined from 4,093
to 3,798 outlets. In 1983, Mobil sold its local operations to Caltex while Shell
Figure 3. Oil industry segments
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purchased Getty. By the mid-1980s, the industry was transformed into a heavily
regulated oligopolistic sector. Only three operators (PNOC or Petron, Shell and
Caltex) remained and controlled over 90 percent of the oil industry.
In 1987, the BOE was reconstituted into the ERB and tasked to regulate the
whole energy sector. Its powers included fixing and regulating the prices of petro-
leum products, piped gas by franchised gas companies and electric utilities, in-
cluding the NPC. The ERB ensured that oil prices were within the established
price bands, with the OPSF acting as buffer fund in artificially stabilizing prices.
Meanwhile, the DOE maintained oil supply stability by regulating the importation
of crude oil and oil derivatives; number of refineries, depots, storage tanks and
retail outlets; and quality and quantity of oil products to protect consumers against
adulteration and short selling.
Pricing was fixed with public hearings conducted every two months. The
basic mechanism was a mark-up based on the landed cost of crude over the previ-
ous two-month period. A direct company recovery mechanism, which guaranteed
a baseline profit for firms, was embedded in the pricing structure. Cross-subsidies
were also provided for, with socially sensitive products such as liquefied petro-
leum gas (LPG) and kerosene being priced lower than gasoline. Higher taxes were
imposed on fuels consumed by the rich, although the lower taxed fuels contrib-
uted proportionately more to, but received proportionately less from, the OPSF.
Aside from the heavy financial burden it imposed on the government, the OPSF
distorted prices and led to inefficient resource allocation within the industry. Be-
cause of such market distortions, investments in refinery capacity were effectively
discouraged. By the 1990s, the regulatory system became unsustainable due to the
fiscal pressures from the OPSF. In 1990, the government infused P5 billion, which
was entirely wiped out by 1992.
Deregulation phase: 1996-1998
In March 1996, the first Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act (Republic
Act 8180) was legislated to remove price controls, abolish the OPSF and exchange
rate protection and liberalize entry into the industry. In October 1996, however,
the Supreme Court declared Republic Act 8180 unconstitutional because of cer-
tain provisions that supposedly promoted anti-competitive behavior. These points
were:
) Definition of predatory pricing;
) Four percent tariff differential between imported crude and imported
refined petroleum products; and
) 40-day inventory requirement for new entrants.ALDABA 99
In February 1998, Republic Act 8479 was passed into a law. It was similar
to Republic Act 8180 except that the three concerns mentioned above were appro-
priately considered and revised as follows:
) Predatory pricing would refer to pricing below average variable cost;
) Three percent tariff would be imposed on all petroleum products; and
) 40-day inventory requirement for new entrants was removed.
Republic Act 8479 indicated a five-month transition period before full de-
regulation was implemented in the industry. During the transition phase, all prices
were fixed at their 12 February 1998 level. The government provided a buffer
fund to account for any price increases in all petroleum products except petro-
leum gasoline. Moreover, an automatic oil pricing mechanism (APM) was estab-
lished to enable local prices to accurately reflect international prices. Except for
“socially sensitive” products such as kerosene and LPG, full deregulation was
adopted in March 1998.
With the liberalization of entry and the removal of price controls, govern-
ment regulation has since been confined to the following areas:
) Enforcement that environmental, planning, product quality, and health
and safety laws are enforced and that the reporting requirements on
imports and exports for the Basel Convention (of which the Philip-
pines is a signatory) are met;
) Ascertaining that gasoline stations advertise their prices and that the
DOE publishes comparative price information on its website;
) Observing that a Department of Justice and DOE task force is created
to investigate unreasonable price increases and punish offenders;
) Enforcing the requirements that firms involved in the refining business
are to offer 10 percent of their common stock within three years either
of the effectivity of revised Oil Industry Deregulation Act or of com-
mencing operations, through a public offering in the Philippine Stock
Exchange, and that no person holds more than 5 percent of each firm’s
stock;
) Ensuring that the government retains ownership of 40 percent of Petron
shares, even as the management of Petron’s operations has largely been
ceded to Saudi Aramco; and
) Seeing to it that the following incentives are provided in order to at-
tract new investors:
- Income tax holiday
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- A minimum tax, duty and value-added tax of 3 percent on imported
capital equipment
- Tax credit on domestic capital equipment
- Exemption from the contractor’s tax
- Unrestricted use of consigned equipment
- Exemption from real property tax on production equipment
- Exemption from duties and taxes on imported spare parts.
Emerging issues
Remaining barriers to competition
Since the deregulation of the downstream oil industry, new players have entered
the petroleum industry and have gained a share of the market. Prior to deregula-
tion, the industry was dominated by what is generally known as the Big Three:
namely, Petron, Shell and Caltex. Their combined share has declined from 95.6
percent in 1998 to 91.3 percent in 1999 and further down to 90.1 percent in 2000.
As of the third quarter of 2000, 61 new players have engaged in different
activities in the oil industry. In terms of investment, new players invested about
P12 billion. Fuels bulk marketing received the highest level of new investments
(followed by retailing), possibly because of relatively lower entry barriers: Not
only do bulk sales not need extensive distribution or retail networks, they also
have simple facilities requirements and low capital outlay.
After deregulation, the country’s total refining capacity increased to 400
billion barrels per day, a marked improvement from the lackluster performance
prior to the reforms. The Big Three still control all refineries, with Petron ac-
counting for the highest refining capacity.
While deregulation has allowed the entry of a significant number of new
players in the industry, competition has not yet been sufficient to put a downward
pressure on retail pump prices. In large part, this is because the retail business
requires extensive distribution or retail networks, which are difficult to set up,
given that retail outlets are expensive to construct (estimated at P10 million to
P20 million per outlet) and often require red-tape-plagued environmental and plan-
ning approvals. Thus, with the new players hampered by the high costs of network
creation and effectively unable to price gasoline way below those of their more
entrenched competition, the Big Three continue to dominate the retail networks
and to have some control over retail prices. In effect, the high costs of setting up
distribution networks has proved to be a significant barrier to entry that needs to
be addressed by the government’s competition policy if retail pump prices are to
become more responsive to competitive pressure.
Using econometric models to assess retail gasoline price movements and
crude cost changes in the Philippines, Salas (2002) found that retail price adjust-ALDABA 101
ments were characterized by an eight-week response lag to crude cost changes.
He also found that the deregulation of the oil industry has accelerated the adjust-
ment speed of retail prices to crude cost changes. Another interesting finding was
the asymmetry in the adjustment speed: Retail prices responded more quickly and
more fully to crude price increases rather than to a similar crude price reduction.
This indicated that there were positive economic profits being made in the indus-
try, hence presenting scope for more competition. However, there is clearly a need
to closely analyze firm behavior as this asymmetric pricing could be an indication
of tacit collusion and market power.
Deregulation failure and rising prices
From January 1999 to July 2000, the pump price of diesel increased by 59 per-
cent while that of petrol rose by 46 percent (Cororaton 2000). These develop-
ments were the result of (a) the increase in world price of crude oil from US$10
per barrel in March 1999 to around US$38 per barrel in September 2000 due to
the oligopolistic maneuverings of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) and (b) the depreciation of the peso, exacerbated by the fact that
the country imports about 97 percent of its total crude oil needs. But in reaction
the public demanded the government to intervene and revert to the old price
control regime.
Successive price increases were met with widespread protests and fed the
public perception that industry deregulation had failed to control the collusive
behavior of the Big Three. Public transport groups lobbied for increases in fare
rates and threatened the government with major strikes. Other organizations sought
to dismiss the oil price deregulation law. To address the supposed anti-competi-
tive practices of the Big Three, a draft bill in the Lower House proposed the cre-
ation of a government-owned national oil exchange company: A monopoly, the
Exchange would forecast the aggregate demand for all refined petroleum prod-
ucts, source these by an international open bidding process and sell the imports to
distributors. Most studies showed, however, that the model was not feasible for
the Philippine oil industry, and support for the proposal soon fizzled out.
To release some of the inflationary pressures on retail prices, the govern-
ment responded by adjusting the tariff rates on imported crude oil and refined
petroleum products. Unfortunately, this proved merely to be a short-term solution
with a large adverse impact on the fiscal deficit. Moreover, as indicated in Salas
(2002), instead of passing on the relief to consumers, the oil firms appropriated
the surplus to further increase their profit margins.
Deregulation has indeed allowed the industry to attain some levels of com-
petition as new players gained market share and continued to plan expansion
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advertisements, raffle promos, fuel rebates and their tie-up with convenience stores.
However, given the present capacity constraint faced by the new small players, it
will take some time before they could aggressively engage in price competition.
Need for more comprehensive competition law and policy
and a competition body
Deregulation is not enough to ensure that markets perform efficiently and that
their outcomes would be equitable. Rules are needed to orient the behavior of
agents and institutions toward supporting the markets’ development. Thus, the
public’s interest should be factored in as well. This requires the formulation of
competition law and policy that will protect the competitive process and encour-
age competitive behavior that will promote economic efficiency.
Under the present law, a DOJ-DOE task force oversees anti-competitive
acts. The task force is mandated to investigate and prosecute cases of predatory
pricing, cartels and unreasonable price increases. The task force has convened a
number of times but its work has been hindered by the (1) lack of manpower,
experience in antitrust investigations and judicial precedents in this area; and (2)
inability to investigate cases outside the three anti-competitive violations earlier
specified (Galang and Solleza 2001).
Cabalu et al. (2001) raise three issues on the current framework of the down-
stream oil industry:
) Some components are missing while others are inadequate. The penal-
ties for violations of anti-trust offenses are inappropriate; they are
either too harsh or too lenient. Other aspects of anti-trust such as
mergers and government-imposed barriers to entry are not covered;
) There is no coherent overall framework for competition policy in the
Philippines. Rather than having Congress enact separate legislation by
sector, it is administratively more efficient to adopt a single compre-
hensive set of policy rules for all sectors;
) Enforcement officials as well as judges lack the expertise to effectively
enforce current laws.
SUMMING UP
Deregulation is not a trivial process. Given conflicting interests and different con-
stituencies, social tensions are inevitable as the cases of the electric power and
downstream oil industries have shown. It may be noted that ERC is itself undergo-
ing tremendous transformation as it attempts to adapt to its new dual role as
regulatory-cum-competition agency in a changing environment. Regulatory ca-
pacity is not acquired overnight. It is a process that requires adequate training,
accumulation of knowledge through trial and error, progressive narrowing of theALDABA 103
information gap between the regulator and the regulated firms as well as the avail-
ability of technical, managerial and administrative resources.
In the electricity sector, the absence of clear rules and appropriate regula-
tory framework in the early stage of deregulation led to discretionary decision-
making, further resulting in high long-term costs and a societal backlash. The
Philippine experience shows that while successful in overcoming the power crisis
in the early 1990s, the power purchase agreements with independent power pro-
ducers created an enormous volume of contingent liabilities to the government
and led to severe upward pressure on the enduser tariffs. This thus triggered wide-
spread public outrage. Given the manner in which these projects were pursued,
the net benefit to the economy might not be positive.
These problems, inherited from the Ramos administration, are constraining
the efforts of the Macapagal administration to deregulate and restructure the sec-
tor. The lack of accountability is evident when former President Fidel Ramos
claimed that his administration inherited the problems from the Aquino govern-
ment. With the regulatory practice in the Philippines of leaving the final
decisionmaking on controversial issues to the President, the tendency to pursue
policies with short-term benefits—even if these involve high long-term costs in
efficiency and overall welfare—has been strong. This thus highlights the need to
establish strong governance and regulatory framework in the country.
Among the immediate challenges that should be addressed are: What should
be the appropriate policy on stranded costs? How should the underlying cost of
IPPs be allocated? What should be the correct policy on rate unbundling and re-
balancing? How should the price increase arising from the removal of subsidies
be managed?
The social tension arising from these issues cannot be prolonged; other-
wise, this would slow down the reform process and make it difficult to effectively
set up the necessary regulatory framework. Complex and crucial issues such as
access rules for transmission and distribution as well as a pricing system that would
allow consumers to share in efficiency gains are still in need of attention. Barely a
year ago, the country has adopted a revenue cap regulation for transmission rates
and is currently finalizing the rules and guidelines governing a price cap for retail
distribution rates. Note that in the evaluation of the costs and benefits of the shift
to a price cap, a lot will depend on the economic conditions of the industry, the
legal and political environment, availability of information and the technical ca-
pabilities of the regulator.
The institutional capacity of the ERC to effectively carry out its regulatory
functions is another important issue. It is responsible for setting the rules of the
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aging the social conflict, improving accountability, ensuring transparency and
building up the regulatory mechanisms to address problems of market failure and
anti-competitive practices. Note that ERC itself is undergoing tremendous trans-
formation as it attempts to adapt to its new role of regulator and competition
agency in a changing environment. Regulatory capacity is not built overnight. It is
a process that requires adequate training, accumulation of knowledge through
trial and error, progressive narrowing of the information gap between the regulator
and the regulated firms as well as the availability of technical, managerial and
administrative resources.
For the downstream oil sector, deregulation has resulted in some degree of
competition as new players entered and gained market shares. However, faced
with a capacity constraint, these new entrants are unable to aggressively engage
in price competition. Retail requires extensive retail networks, which only the Big
Three players dominate. Moreover, retail outlets are expensive to construct and
often require tedious environmental and planning approvals. This advantage to
the big players poses an entry barrier that needs to be addressed. There is also a
need to closely analyze firm behavior, as the asymmetric pricing in the industry
could be an indication of tacit collusion and market power.
The successive oil price increases triggered widespread protests and public
perception that the industry deregulation failed. Ideally, the task force that acts as
the industry’s competition body should help manage the tension by communicat-
ing and explaining the deregulation process to the public. Though politically un-
palatable, the point must be made—and the public made to understand—that
setting up a truly competitive environment requires a lot of work and that deregu-
lation does not instantaneously lead to lower prices. This necessitates the need to
strengthen the existing competition laws in the industry and their implementation.
The DOJ-DOE task force assigned to oversee anti-competitive acts in the industry
is currently improperly equipped to address the emerging competition issues in
the sector.ALDABA 105
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